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Abstract
This paper discusses the design and evaluation of an artificial agent for collaborative
musical free improvisation. The agent provides a means to investigate the
underpinnings of improvisational interaction. In connection with this general goal, the
system is also used here to explore the implementation of a collaborative musical agent
using a specific robotics architecture, Subsumption. The architecture of the system is
explained, and its evaluation in an empirical study with expert improvisors is discussed.
A follow-up study using a second iteration of the system is also presented. The system
design and connected studies bring together Subsumption robotics, ecological
psychology, and musical improvisation, and contribute to an empirical grounding of an
ecological theory of improvisation.
Designers of human-computer interactive systems for musical improvisation have taken
diverse approaches to system development. Some of these systems implement an
abstract model of the human mind (e.g., Rowe 1992), while others implement a model of
the sonic and emotional organizational principles of improvisation, and emergent
collective musical behavior (e.g., Lewis 1999). Specific design strategies for producing
“weakly to strongly musician-like” interactive performances may cover an extensive
range of computational models and techniques including “swarms, recurrent neural
networks, and simulations of self-organizing criticality systems such as sand piles and
forest fires” (Bown 2011). Significantly, the development of such systems has often been
for artistic ends. For those developed primarily to produce output that fulfills aesthetic
criteria, a valid design strategy may draw upon whatever technical means are available,
rather than be artificially bound to a given model or limited to a particular set of
techniques.
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The system described below, Adam Linson’s Odessa, is an artificial agent designed for
research into the complex dynamics of the situated psychosocial and embodied
cognitive practice of musical improvisation. The design is not intended to faithfully
reproduce biological or psychological mechanisms, nor to exhibit humanlike musicality;
it does, however, provide a starting point for modeling the sonic-behavioral dynamics of
a collaborative musical improvisor. Despite its simplified design, the activity of the
system is governed by the interactive complexity of real-time, real-world free
improvisation. Odessa thereby provides a means to investigate the underpinnings of
improvisational interaction. In connection with this general goal, the system is also used
here to explore the implementation of a collaborative musical agent using a specific
robotics architecture (Subsumption).
In the following sections, the musical context relevant to the design of Odessa is
introduced, a detailed account of the system design is given, and related systems are
compared. Then, after a discussion of the initial evaluation, a second design iteration
and follow-up study are presented, concluding with a general discussion.
Design
This section presents the design of Odessa. It includes some background on the musical
context, discusses unstructured input and models, and provides descriptions of the
system’s streaming output mechanisms and an account of its interactivity. Subsequently,
an overview of the system architecture will reveal how its components are integrated.
Some examples of module content will also be given. The section concludes with a
comparison to related systems.
Odessa, implemented in ChucK (Wang et al. 2007; Wang 2008), functions dynamically as a
parsimonious cognitive model from which complex human-interactive musical behavior
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emerges. Its computationally lightweight and modular design is a novel application of
Rodney Brooks’ (1999) subsumption architecture (Subsumption, hereafter), which was
originally developed for building mobile robots. In Subsumption terminology, the
“competing behaviors” of a system are organized into a network of interactive “layers”
(Brooks 1999). Following this idea, and further informed by psychological research,
Odessa’s behavioral layers consist of its basic agency to spontaneously produce output
(‘Play’), its ability to respond to musical input (‘Adapt’), and its ability to resist by
disregarding musical input, introducing silence, and initiating endings (‘Diverge’).
(These layers and related background are discussed in depth further below.)
The design of Odessa was inspired by parallels found in two accounts that connect
ecological psychology to, respectively, Subsumption robotics (Clark 1997) and musical
improvisation (Clarke 2005). By bringing together the latter two, this research in turn
contributes to the empirical grounding of an ecological theory of improvisation.
Although Brooks has expressed his own narrow view of musical communication,
through the suggestion that it is dependent on visual interaction (see Lewis 2007), it is
notable that his former student and collaborator Jonathan Connell (whose work led to
important revisions in Subsumption) describes their (non-musical) mobile robot as
having the ability to “improvise”, in this case, describing the navigation of dynamic
physical environments such as busy offices (Connell 1989). Thus considered, research
into computer improvisation — musical or otherwise — fits with the more general aim
of robotics research to build “autonomous artificial cognitive systems that are to pursue
their goals successfully in real-world environments that cannot be fully anticipated, that
are not fully known and that change continuously, including other agents” (Müller 2012,
p. 1).
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Musical context: Free improvisation
Referring to specific historical events that marked the emergence of an international
community of free improvisors, Lewis (2004) writes of “the core conception of placing
musicians in a space with few or no externally imposed preconditions — or rather, the
histories and personalities of the musicians themselves constituted the primary
preconditions”. This conception underlies the experimental setup of the initial empirical
research on Odessa (further described in the ‘Methodology’ section). It is assumed that
present-day artificial agents do not share the equivalent of human “histories and
personalities”. Without consciousness or a capacity for reflection, such agents cannot
experience the cultural dimension of improvisation (see Chella and Manzotti 2012). This
is not to deny, however, that “technological inventions ... are fundamentally human (and
social) constructions, and as such embody and enable specific values, agendas, and
possibilities” (Ensmenger 2011; see also Lewis 2000).
Nonetheless, the interactional behavior of improvising can be investigated in terms of
the dynamic coupling of human and computer agents. Irrespective of field, any research
into human behavior should be expected to account for the rich complexity of an
‘environment’ or ‘situation’, a complexity that is particularly evident in the case of an
improvisational musical encounter. It is hoped that Odessa can contribute to an
understanding of some of the ways in which this complexity arises, and some of the
roles it plays in human experience.
Odessa’s unstructured input and models
The Subsumption approach to handling input and output, which can also be thought of
as an approach to agent–environment interaction, is highly suggestive of the cognitive
engagement by performers of free improvisation. During free improvisation, performers
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exhibit tight coupling between listening and playing. They also have a robust, flexible
approach to dealing with unpredictable changes in the environment (Clarke 2005; see
also Sudnow 2001).
For Subsumption systems, the ability to “respond quickly to changes in the world” is, in
part, achieved by a means of accommodating unstructured input, as opposed to
expecting input to conform to an internal model (Brooks 1999, p. 68). Brooks’ (1999)
work has shown that his robots function effectively without the use of internal models,
that is, without ideal formalizations of the outside world which tend to limit
responsiveness. Odessa follows the Subsumption approach of eschewing models, using
Brooks’ insight that “the world is its own best model” (Brooks 1999, pp. 115, 128).
This aspect of Subsumption is significant in relation to previous approaches to modeling
improvisation. Certain forms of improvisative music have proved amenable to
formalized musical description, e.g., using rules for fitting a melody to a chord
progression (e.g., Biles 1994). Such musical formalizations, however, are generally
regarded as abstractions of an embodied performance tradition that do not necessarily
indicate how it is approached by human musicians (see, e.g., Bailey 1980/1993). While
there has been some work on formal models of free improvisation, these have typically
relied on non-musical formalizations, such as dynamical systems models (e.g., Blackwell
and Young 2004; Borgo and Goguen 2005).
Clearly, a non-learning system such as Odessa is limited in certain musical respects by its
lack of internal models. However, the present research concerns its collaborative role in
human–computer interactive free improvisation. It is hypothesized that Odessa’s ability
to collaborate with experts in this domain is not compromised by these formal musical
limitations (see Stevens (1985) for one approach to free improvisation that is neutral with
respect to formal musical abilities). Collaboration, in the sense used here, can be
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understood as interactive engagement that potentially leads to unanticipated musical
outcomes.
Streaming output
This subsection addresses Odessa’s note stream formation and decomposition.
Note stream formation
Implementing a mechanism for continuous musical output, that is, for a continuous note
stream, poses a challenge when seeking to adhere to Subsumption principles. By
definition, Subsumption agents lack high-level representation, so there is no
straightforward way to achieve the coordinated integration of short input–output cycles
into an abstract global timeline. From a traditional perspective, this would seem to
present a difficulty for the construction of a continuous musical output stream that may
include musical phrases, rests, and textures.
Continuous stream formation in Odessa, consistent with the Subsumption principle of
short cycles, is depicted in Figure 1. It is achieved as follows: a continuous series of
discrete monophonic note streams are passively integrated into a continuous polyphonic
note stream. The stream formed by this process is continuous and polyphonic, as multiple
segments are spawned before other segments (audible sequences of notes) have
terminated. This results in overlap between the discrete segments, which provides
continuity and also serves to form chords and complex rhythms. The integration is
passive because the monophonic note streams are spawned without any explicit
coordination, other than their successive delivery to the sound producing mechanism
(synthesized or acoustic).
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Figure 1. Approximation of streaming output formation (arrows indicate merging). No traditional
notation is used in the system, nor is there any note-level synchronization or quantization.
Although no notation is used in the actual system, Figure 1 depicts an approximation of
the note stream formation process as an imagined transcription of a musical section (the
bottommost staff). The upper four staves show four note sequences independently
generated in complete cycles. In the actual system, such sequences are neither globally
quantized nor synchronized to one another in a musical sense (technically, there is
hardware-level synchronization due to a shared processor clock, although, in principle,
multiple asynchronous processors could be used).
Note stream decomposition
In the literature on interactive music systems, a common design abstraction is a
functional decomposition into listening, analysis, and performance (e.g., Rowe 1992;
Lewis 1999; Wulfhorst et al. 2003; Blackwell and Young 2004; Assayag et al. 2006; Hsu
2010, etc.). Odessa is decomposed differently, following Subsumption principles that
result in a distribution of components without a central locus of representation or
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control (Brooks 1999). This contrast is depicted in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Top: Traditional horizontal decomposition with layers between input and output; Bot-
tom: Subsumption vertical decomposition in which each layer connects input to output (adapted
from Brooks (1999), p. 67).
Separate subsystems are used for pitch, loudness, and timing, respectively, in both input
and output. As would be expected of a Subsumption system, Odessa uses no formal
musical knowledge such as scales, tonal keys, motifs, etc., and also lacks any
representational model.1 In contrast, in other free improvisation systems, one or more of
these means are typically used, for example, representation of Western tonal harmony
(e.g., Rowe 1992), stored motifs (e.g., Collins 2006), and representation of notes as a
particle swarm (e.g., Blackwell and Young 2004).
With Odessa, incoming sound to the soundcard (transduced via microphone or pickup) is
1To clarify this point, it is certainly the case that an external observer may interpret the actions of the
system in terms of Western musical representations (e.g., semitones, octaves), or in terms of a scientific
(mathematical-physical) description (e.g. Hertz, the harmonic series). Indeed, in the ChucK software used,
a number of these abstractions are present for human convenience. However, it is important to stress that at
no time are these part of a representational model used by the system itself. The system simply extracts the
strongest incoming physical vibrations via the transducer and transforms them in isolation of any model
(apart from the weak sense of a ‘number line’ model implicit in incrementing or decrementing values), i.e.,
it does not make use of any specified relationships between model-internal elements (the usual sense of
both a musical and world model).
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analyzed in separate, uniparametric dimensions: frequency for pitch approximation,
amplitude for loudness approximation, and time between notes. These parameters are
concurrently analyzed by dedicated modules (i.e., one for each). Output is formed
through an integration of these separate parameter streams (described in the preceding
subsection).
A similar approach to dealing with computer-based musical information was proposed
by Conklin and Witten (1995), with their notion of “viewpoint decomposition”.
“Viewpoints” are independent abstractions for “expressing events in a sequence” in
terms of a single parameter of a musical event’s “internal structure” (e.g., pitches,
intervals, durations). To form complete musical sequences, a variety of individual
abstractions are recombined into “linked” viewpoints. Conklin and Witten’s technique
was specifically developed for probability-based analyses of a corpus in the service of
generating new works similar to those in the training set. In contrast to this and related
approaches such as Cope’s (2005), Odessa does not use probabilistic input analysis.
Instead, it uses simple input transformations (described further below).
Interactivity
This subsection gives an account of Odessa’s interaction model, its human–computer
interactive behavior, and the interaction of its constituent subsystems.
Interaction model
A distinction between two common meanings of the word ‘system’ in software
development has been pointed out by computer scientist Michael A. Jackson (2001, p.
11): there is the narrow sense of a computational system that is generally comprised of
hardware with installed software; and, there is also a broader system that includes the
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narrow system, its deployment environment, and its users. The narrow system cannot
be effectively designed without an understanding of the broader system. Although it
may not always be appropriate to think of an independent robot agent as having users, it
is nonetheless the case that humans interacting with Odessa are part of a broader system.
It is within this broader system that the collaborative interaction between artificial and
human agents takes place.
It is thus relevant to discuss Odessa’s interaction model, in addition to its isolated system
properties. By design, Subsumption agents “[rely] heavily on the dynamics of their
interactions with the world to produce their results” (Brooks 1999, p. 68). As Suchman
(2007) points out, these “interactions with the world”, for Brooksian mobile robots, are
“understood primarily in physical terms”, “evacuated of sociality” (p. 15). But for a
musical Subsumption agent, the agent–environment interaction may indeed be social.
This is especially the case for an agent that performs free improvisation, a practice that
arguably consists of a fundamental psychosocial dynamic (Sansom 1997; see also
Davidson 2004).
Odessa is designed to interact with human improvisors as an individual participant in a
shared collaborative performance. This approach to the human–computer relationship
differs from Pachet’s (2003), whose Continuator is presented as a means to extend an
individual’s musical performance capacities. Pachet’s system uses machine learning as a
basis for its ability to musically interact, in contrast to Odessa and other systems such as
Hsu’s (2010). But while the latter’s interaction abilities are tailored to specific
instrumental techniques, Odessa is designed to function with a wide variety of
instruments and players.
By responding to and introducing affordance-rich material into a collaborative context,
Odessa adopts a model of interaction characteristic of musical free improvisation
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between humans. In terms of human-computer interaction, the nature of this model is
encapsulated by Lewis’ (1999) description of his Voyager, one of the first computer
systems built expressly for this type of music: “there is no built-in hierarchy of human
leader / computer follower, no ‘veto’ buttons, pedals, or cues” (Lewis 1999). This
general approach to interaction design is shared by other systems with similar aims,
such as those by Blackwell and Young (2004) and Collins (2006), although
implementations vary greatly. More generally, this interaction model is opposed to
“game-theory models of social interaction that emphasize self-interest”, and instead
emphasizes coordination, “interdependence”, and “mutual control” (Young 2010). The
human and computer players function as tightly coupled subsystems, exerting a
constant reciprocal influence on one another.
Interactive behavior
Collaborative musical free improvisation is a form of interaction between distinct
individuals who collectively negotiate the construction of a musical piece in real time,
without anything agreed upon in advance (Bailey 1980/1993, pp. 83ff). Thus, an
artificial agent must sufficiently convey to a collaborative human co-performer that it is
listening, responding, cooperating, adapting, and also that it is a distinct entity capable
of making independent musical contributions. The collection of these and similar
capabilities points to an agent’s (apparent) intentionality, which, more generally, suggests
that it understands its actions in relation to its environment, and that it engages in
purposive behavior. (Note that attributed or apparent intentionality differs from the
philosophical notion of ‘intrinsic’ intentionality; see Dennett (1987) for a critical
discussion.) Research in psychology, discussed below, suggests that a combination of
perceptual cues — perceived when observing and interacting with an agent — lead to
the attribution of intentionality.
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One design goal of Odessa was to produce such cues to convey intentionality, in order for
interactions with the system to reflect the character of collaborative free improvisation.
A Subsumption agent, described as a “collection of competing behaviors” (Brooks 1999,
p. 90), lends itself to the production of such cues when the agent’s behaviors are
organized as an interplay of adaptation and resistance, an idea based on insights from
psychology (e.g., Poulin-Dubois and Shultz (1988); Csibra (2008); Király et al. (2003);
Barrett and Johnson (2003); see also Müller (2011)). Such research can be traced back to
an early empirical study of adults, which found that they were prone to interpret certain
movements of animated geometric shapes as the actions of persons (Heider and Simmel
1944). Current empirical psychology research on the attribution of intentionality has
played an important role in contemporary cognitive modeling (e.g., Baldwin and Baird
2001) and biomedical research (e.g., Castelli et al. 2002).
For the design of Odessa, it was hypothesized that the behavioral decomposition into
Play, Adapt, and Diverge would serve to produce cues that suggest intentionality. These
three levels (or ‘layers’, discussed in more depth below) also reflect the system’s design
history, which followed the Subsumption approach of developing and fine-tuning the
layers from lowest to highest, with higher levels typically intervening in and modifying
the behaviour of lower ones. Adapt and Diverge form distinct higher-level behaviors of
the system, while the basic Play mechanism forms the lowest-level behavior. From a
design standpoint, adaptation has been interpreted as an adaptation to the musical
behavior of the human co-performer, while resistance has been interpreted as producing
a divergence from the human behavior, to potentially lead the collaboration in a
different musical direction.
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Layer interaction
The Play, Adapt, and Diverge behaviors of Odessa are separated into Subsumption ‘layers’
(networks of simple modules), as depicted in Figure 3. Using Brooks’ convention, the
circles marked ‘i’ indicate inhibition and those marked ‘s’ indicate suppression (Figure 3).
When data is inhibited, the data is blocked from transmission along the line of data flow
between modules. When data is suppressed, data flowing from one module is replaced by
data from a different source module.
In the absence of external (sonic) input from a human co-performer, the Play layer
generates an independent musical output stream. When external input is detected, the
Adapt behavior is activated, which results in the output stream adapting to the human
co-performer’s musical behavior by using pitches, loudness, and timing derived from
and closely related to the input source. The design aim here is to give the human
performer a sense of Odessa cooperating.
However, if this layer remains activated for an extended period, the behavior could be
perceived as too passive, thereby negating the sense that Odessa exhibits intentionality.
Thus, when a timer expires in the Adapt layer after it is active for a certain period, the
Diverge layer is activated. The initial duration of the timer is set to a restricted
pseudorandom value that is typically between 5 and 15 seconds. This value is
recalculated each time the timer is reset after expiry, so as to be irregular and
unpredictable. An equivalent version of this timer is found in the Play and Diverge layers,
to prevent them from being active for too long. The Play timer range is also typically
5–15 seconds, and the Diverge layer uses different timers for each of its internal modules.
The result of these timers is a dynamic interplay between layers. This interplay allows
for the human co-performer to perceive the system’s ability to react to input, and its
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Figure 3. Odessa architecture. Modules are indicated by named boxes. Layers are separated
by dotted lines. Solid lines indicate data flow in direction of arrow. Circles marked ‘i’ indicate
inhibition and those marked ‘s’ indicate suppression (see ). *Receives external audio input.
**Transmits external audio output. †Transforms input to output values by raising or lowering
one semitone, or leaving them unaltered. ‡Translates input value into a collection of neighbouring
output values.
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ability to introduce different musical material. The human co-performer may not
necessarily respond to such different musical material, but this is also the case in strictly
human performances of collaborative free improvisation.
Module simplicity
The potentially surprising simplicity of Odessa’s modules, when considered in the
context of their practical roles in the system behavior, forms a key strength of this
research. Brooks (1999) notes that although his original paper on Subsumption has
become the most referenced paper he has written, at the time of its 1986 publication, it
was “shocking” to senior roboticists, “because it argued for simplicity rather than for
mathematical complexity of analysis and implementation” (p. 3). He adds that many
people in the field “feel that their work is not complete if it does not have pages of
equations, independently of whether those equations shed any light at all on the deep
questions” (p. 3).
One aim of developing an artificial agent for collaborative free improvisation using
Subsumption is to demonstrate that complex interactive behavior, subject to evaluation
by experts, can emerge from simple interactions between simple modules in a complex
environment. Thus, at every instance where a more complex module operation could be
substituted, a simple variant has been used instead. The use of simple operations is
significant because, for computer-generated music, it is well-known that a
mathematically interesting process can become a sonically interesting process when
certain mappings between them are used (e.g., for constructing melodies, harmonies,
rhythms, orchestrations, etc.; see, e.g., Xenakis (1992)). For Odessa, if a complex module
were used in place of a simple one, the source of complex interactive musical output
could not be exclusively attributed to simple interactions between simple modules.
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Module examples
The following are representative examples of module content (see Figure 3), illustrating
their simplicity.
Pitch sensor. Continuously polls the sonic input signal from human instrumentalist and
extracts the strongest frequency values from the spectrum. Peak spectral information
often picks out higher harmonics rather than the fundamental input frequency. This
approach to input pitch analysis stands in contrast to a more computationally expensive
procedure to more reliably pick out fundamental frequencies. A similar trade-off is
described in Brooks (1999, pp. 43–44), where less computationally expensive sensor
reading analyses, when used effectively, can lead to robust performance by a mobile
robot.
The practical aim of this module is to use the extracted pitch values to affect the pitch
values in the system output, to facilitate collaborative interaction with a human
co-performer. This aim is not compromised by picking out higher harmonics. In fact,
this approach to pitch extraction actually gives the impression of an enhanced musical
behavior, by producing appropriate responses to richly harmonic input. In short, it
facilitates the agent’s sharing of a harmonic space with the human co-performer. This is
accomplished with the Subsumption approach, that is, without recourse to any
high-level formal knowledge of musical theory.
Pitch algorithms. Incoming pitch (input from either performer or pitch generator input)
is transformed according to an arbitrarily selected operation that either lowers the pitch
by one semitone, raises the pitch by one semitone, or leaves it unaltered. The three
alternatives have a theoretically equal probability. The purpose of this transformation is
to introduce slight variations, so that the module output is not identical to its input.
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Time between pitches. Finds the duration of silence between incoming notes,
specifically between a note endpoint and the onset of the next note. This value was
empirically determined to be more useful than interonset values or note durations, as it
gives a sense of what could be referred to as sonic ‘density’. Thus, whether staccato
notes or long tones are received as input, the duration of silence in between notes
suggests that more or less note activity is taking place.
Throttle. Inhibits pitch values (forces all notes to be rests) for an empirically determined
duration of 500 milliseconds (.5 seconds) after each audible segment is produced. In
practice, this allows for enough overlap between segments to produce chords and
complex rhythms (see Figure 1), but preserves the sense of a single agent performing.
Other Subsumption-related computer music systems
Reactive Accompanist
Joanna Bryson (1995) was the first to develop a musical agent using Subsumption. Her
system, the Reactive Accompanist thus relates to Odessa, in so far as both are Subsumption
agents for music. Although she does not refer to improvisation as the agent competence
she seeks to evaluate, her description does, however, imply the evaluation of an
improvisational competence. She refers to the evaluation of a “folk” approach to music,
which, in her account, corresponds to the way in which real human instrumentalists
(folk musicians) can skilfully elaborate a real-time accompaniment to an unknown
melody, without the benefit of a score (p. 6). In addition, her research uses a qualitative
evaluation methodology based on human assessment, which is, in this respect, similar to
the research on Odessa, although the methodological details differ substantially.
Despite these general similarities, it is considerably difficult to directly compare the two
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systems. This is due to significant differences in both the nature of the musical
competencies being modeled by the systems, and specific implementation details that
relate in part to design decisions, and in part to changes in the state of technology since
the time her system was developed. These differences are highlighted here.
The aim of Bryson’s system is “to derive chord structure from a melody in real time”,
which “emulates the human competence of providing chord accompaniment to
unfamiliar music” (p. 20). She clarifies that her system should produce a “harmonious
accompaniment to the melody”, although she acknowledges that “just what is
‘considered harmonious’ is subjective” (p. 20). Musicians and lay persons were used for
her system evaluation to “judge whether the chord structure of the piece ‘sounds
reasonable’ ” (p. 20; see also pp. 70–72).
The first point of divergence between the two system designs relates to the notion of
“real time”. As she states, “due to difficulties with signal processing of the input, the
programs are not actually in real time, but the processing they do assumes that they are”
(p. 87). There are several issues to identify here, beginning with the fact that she is faced
with the disadvantage that no “off-the-shelf” real-time Fourier transformer was available
to her, a considerable drawback that stands in stark contrast to today. However, she
contradicts the point that real-time processing is assumed by her system programming,
stating that, if real-time processing were available, “there would be some redesign
involved in the main functions of the robot programs, because in a real-time system one
would not sample the next input, one would sample the current input” (p. 82, original
emphasis). Of course, she is pointing out a logical implication, but it underscores the
difficulty in comparing her system with one that performs in real time, such as Odessa.
In addition, in contrast to Odessa, her system is constructed from several neural networks
that must be trained in advance. This has the implication that, “as what it hears becomes
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further from its trained input, its performance gradually degrades” (p. 80). Odessa does
not use neural networks, which makes for a more parsimonious computational
implementation, and it does not require any advanced training, which makes it more
flexible with respect to performance context (in the sense that, without any training
‘abstractions’ in the system, there is no potential input that could violate them).
The next point relates to the Reactive Accompanist’s modeled capacity “to derive chord
structure from a melody”. Most of the individual competencies that work together to
achieve this aim necessarily affect one another in a reciprocal fashion. Nevertheless, her
strategy can be thought of as a “bottom-up” approach: identify note boundaries in the
input stream, identify the pitch of each note, relate the pitch to a tonal centre, match the
tonal centre to a chord (stored in advance), and monitor the tonal centre for a break that
would require a new chord. In short, the system “rapidly stabilises to the chord which is
the primary key of the melody” (p. 61), and “the rhythmic perception competences [...]
offer reasonable locations to break off and look for a new chord”, which “results in much
more key-compatible chords being produced as output” (p. 59).
The tonal logic of Bryson’s system calls for a reduction of pitch to pitch class, and the
system depends upon classifying input in terms of tonal key, which it matches to “a
priori” (stored) chordal information. Odessa, on the other hand, uses original (received)
input frequencies within the system, although these may be mapped to (e.g.) notes on
the piano keyboard at the output stage (as is the case with the implementation used in
the present study). Moreover, Odessa does not match input frequencies to a tonal key, as
such matching is not a strict requirement for free improvisation. In addition, in contrast
to Bryson’s system, Odessa does not look for a regular beat to inform the timing of its
output, as free improvisation does not require strict isochrony. Finally, while the chordal
accompaniment of a melody is modeled as a “following” behaviour in Bryson’s system
(the accompanist follows the lead), Odessa may also lead rather than follow, or engage in
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a construction of lines that parallel, but do not match, the human performer (this point is
elaborated on in the General Discussion).
Apart from these system design differences, for the empirical study of the respective
systems, Bryson placed considerably less emphasis on her evaluation. By her own
declaration, “the evaluations were carried out fairly informally” (p. 70). She used two
musicians and herself (also a musician) to evaluate symbolically represented system
output (a melody annotated with conventional chord symbols). She also used two
musicians and herself, plus three lay persons, to listen to and evaluate the system’s
auditory output (on the basis of recordings, in lieu of real time performance). The more
elaborate evaluation of Odessa is described in the next section.
BeatBender
Another documented musical system that describes itself as using Subsumption is
Aaron Levisohn’s and Philippe Pasquier’s (2008) BeatBender. While Bryson’s system is
primarily focused on harmony, BeatBender is focused on rhythm and does not explicitly
take pitch into account (the percussive samples they use could be said to have a
quasi-pitched characteristic). In a broad sense, their system serves as a musical
exploration of how simple interactions between simple rules can result in complex
output, which is a general characteristic of Subsumption systems. However, although
the only available technical description is insufficient to make a precise determination, it
seems their system would be more aptly described as a generative looping multichannel
sequencer, rather than as a Subsumption system.
Their system is presented as a multi-agent system in which each agent controls a
dedicated audio channel. All activated channels are mixed together equally to form an
audio output stream. Each channel is dedicated to a single looping audio segment;
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across channels, all segments have an equal duration and all are synchronised. For each
iteration, a set of conditional rules determines where one or more sound events will
occur in each channel, at various positions within the segment. This results in
continuously changing rhythmic patterns.
In sharp distinction from Subsumption (and, by extension, Odessa), all agents in their
system share common environment variables, which suggests some similarity to a
blackboard architecture (see Corkill 1991; see also Brooks 1999, p. 97). And, significantly,
with their design, no agent receives audio input from outside of the system. The sound
made audible to human observers is strictly a result of human-configurable options and
agent interactions within a purely virtual environment.
Methodology
This section describes the empirical evaluation of the system.
Experiment context and description
The empirical evaluation of Odessa was designed to maximize ecological validity by
matching a number of real world conditions. In this case, gathering the data ‘in the wild’
was precluded by the nature of what was being investigated, namely, the potential of a
musical collaboration to be experienced by a human co-performing with a particular
computer system. However, the experiment was designed to preserve many aspects of a
relatively common mode of encounter among the international community of free
improvisors: when players who have not performed together, and in some cases not met
or heard each other play, engage in real time improvisational musical collaboration.
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The participant selection process was guided by the aim of challenging the system with
a heterogeneous set of interactions and garnering diverse perspectives on it. Having
participants who are experienced and knowledgeable in discussing improvisation was
also important; its success as a selection strategy partly depended on the participants’
trust of the interviewer (the lead author) as a conversation partner when speaking about
a practice that is notoriously difficult to address verbally. More specifically, with
knowledge of the difficult-to-articulate subtleties and complexities of contemporary
musical improvisation, the interviewer was able to recognize provisional statements
(which pose a risk of being misconstrued by those outside of the field), and to elicit
clarifications and additional feedback that may have otherwise gone unstated.
A key disadvantage of the role of the interviewer was the sense that, given the (correct)
perception that it was the system designer in this role, the question remained as to how
critical the participants could be while still feeling tactful and comfortable, in light of the
interviewer/designer’s potential discomfort during such critique. This raised the issue
of the degree to which participants might be holding back more critical responses. Two
interrelated strategies (described below) were used to mitigate this disadvantage,
incorporating modified “think-aloud” sessions and follow-up interviews (for a detailed
account of traditional think-aloud methodology and a modified approach, see
Koro-Ljungberg et al. in press).
Format and procedure
The first strategy was to use unstructured verbal (think-aloud) protocols that took place
immediately following the musical improvisations with the computer player, all of
which preceded any discussion of the system by the interviewer. This lack of discussion
was significant to the framing of the improvisation, so as not to solicit any specific
playing strategies that could implicitly guide the system performance and in turn
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influence the verbal feedback. The openness of the situation allowed for a wide variety
of performance practices and reflections on personal experiences of the improvisations.
Related studies of improvisation without computers have been conducted without a
connection to a specific performance (e.g., MacDonald and Wilson 2006), or have used
listening to recordings as a means for improvisors to reconstruct internal mental
narratives of their performance (e.g., Sansom 1997). For the present study, it was more
relevant to elicit immediate post-performance impressions of the participant experience.
This latter form of commentary permitted considerations of the performance that likely
would have been precluded by a linear analysis of musical playback. In particular,
rather than moving across the temporal axis of the performance, the responses instead
moved from more immediate thoughts to more reflective ones, and tended to oscillate
between describing general aspects of the interaction and specific moments or sections.
After three uninterrupted performance and verbal protocol sessions, a semi-structured
interview was conducted. The interview questions were formulated to prompt long
explanations and avoid implicitly suggesting a specific answer (see Stock 2004); this
comprised the second strategy to encourage forthcoming critical responses. Thus, in
place of asking, for example, “Did the system respond adequately to your playing?”, the
preferred formulation would be, “Did the system respond to your playing adequately,
inadequately, or somewhere in between?”. When apparently superficial or vague
answers were encountered, follow-up questions helped gather more specific data (e.g.,
“You stated that the system responded to your playing ‘pretty adequately’. How would
you characterize what was inadequate about its responses?”).
After completing all the individual sessions, the participant data was analyzed for (intra-
and intersubject) themes, as depicted in Figure 4. Verbal data describing internal mental
or bodily states was analytically correlated across participants; verbal data about
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externally observable aspects of the improvised performances was correlated with the
musical audio recordings of the speaker’s improvisations. Additional interrelationships
between these complementary data sets were also examined.
Figure 4. Data relationships.
Participants
The study consisted of eight experimental case studies, each with a different performer
and instrument. Those who participated are distinguished improvisors of international
stature, who generously shared their time and expertise. The performers (five male,
three female) have diverse backgrounds and span an age range of over three decades. To
indicate the level of expertise, the variety of instruments, and the different approaches to
improvisation, the participants are listed here (in alphabetical order by surname): Paul
Cram, clarinet; Peter Evans, trumpet; Okkyung Lee, cello; Evan Parker, soprano
saxophone; John Russell, guitar; Sara Schoenbeck, bassoon; Pat Thomas, piano; and Ute
Wasserman, vocals. At least four of them had prior experience with interactive computer
improvisors, though in two cases, not since the 1980s. In recent years, Parker has
performed with a number of different systems, and Evans performed with an early
experimental partially-automated Disklavier system by the lead author that later
informed one design component of the initial Odessa prototype (musical stream
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decomposition).
Apparatus
The audio for the cello, guitar, and bassoon was captured using pickups that were
impervious to audio feedback from the system output. This made for a clearer picture of
the system’s specific responses to player input. For the remaining players, a directional
microphone was used, but despite careful setup, it did not achieve perfect separation
between acoustic instrument and amplified computer output. Thus, at points when the
system reached higher volumes, some of its output audio was introduced into the
player’s microphone as low-volume input. Since higher quality directional microphones
were not available for the study, having the players use headphones was considered as
an alternate solution. Ultimately, it was decided that using headphones would be too
dissimilar to an ordinary playing situation, and would thereby compromise the overall
experimental setup. It was thus decided that the less pristine system response to the
player’s input, resulting from the occasional intrusions of audio feedback, was
preferable to an atypical performance setup.
Consistency across studies was important to ensure a clear interpretation of the data,
which would have been undermined by varying the sonic output mechanism. Thus, a
self-imposed limitation of using amplified software synthesis was chosen, due to
participant logistics and the practical difficulty of access to an electromechanically
controlled acoustic piano for all studies, although this would have been preferred. For
the follow-up study described further below, a Disklavier was used. (Audio of the first
iteration of the system using a Disklavier is available here:
<https://soundcloud.com/adamlinson/linson-odessa-iks-goldsmiths/s-ZxqUO>. This
performance was not part of the formal study, but was presented by the lead author (on
double bass) at the Interactive Keyboard Symposium, Goldsmiths, University of London,
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2012.)
Discrete pitches and an emulated piano timbre were used in the study to provide a
familiar point of continuity and interrelation to the participants’ previous experience.
This was intended to help shift the verbal feedback to the topic of collaborative playing,
rather than exploring the seemingly unbounded possibilities of computer-generated
sound. Notably, however, from a technical perspective, the core of the system is easily
adaptable and extensible to other input and output mechanisms. In particular, for input
and output, it is currently capable of continuous as well as discrete pitches, and it is also
possible to extend the system by taking timbre into account, without compromising the
fundamental architecture (for a computer free improvisation system focused on timbre,
see Hsu 2010). These options were deliberately excluded from the study to maintain its
overall consistency and focus.
Results Summary and Discussion
The case studies suggest that the strategy used to achieve perceived intentionality for
collaborative purposes was reasonably effective. To summarize the overall impressions
of the studies, six of the eight participants described a process of familiarization and
improved collaborative engagement over three duet performances. This is particularly
significant given the lack of any machine learning. Two were largely dissatisfied: one
participant found no change across performances and another found the standard of
performances to have been gradually declining.
A different subset of six players indicated that their take on the machine
“anthropomorphized” it, including two who explicitly used that term (or a grammatical
variation). Of these six, four struggled to assign the system a gender identity in their
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discussion, arising from a preference to refer to the system as “he” or “she” rather than
“it”. Notably, the name Odessa had not been disclosed to any of the participants. One
participant’s tendency to associate the system with humanlike qualities could be
discerned through a critical description of the system behaving like “a baby that keeps
enjoying its own sound”. In contrast to these perceptions of a potentially lifelike
intentional agent, one participant stated “I can’t pretend [I am] playing with another
human being”, whereas another simply referred to the system as “the program”. These
latter views allay concerns about a potential confirmation bias in the study design, at
least to a degree, since the careful use of language while conducting the study resulted in
varied participant answers on this point.
Critical feedback from the studies can be categorized under three main headings. The
most significant criticisms pertain directly to the architecture. They include problems
such as the musical homogeneity of the computer playing, or of the computer output
relating either too closely or not closely enough to the human musical input. For
instance, one participant used the term “shadowing” to describe its behavior, consistent
with a view shared by others that it was at times too closely following what they were
doing.
Players also perceived an inability of the system to find (in their words) “common
ground” or a “common language”, indicated by statements such as “it doesn’t know
how to get into your world” and “I kept looking for something that I could [...] go inside
... and after awhile I [...] stopped looking for this”. These somewhat abstract
descriptions were also more directly attributed to the system’s lack of high-level and
long-term constructs with comments such as “I felt like it wants to move away from an
idea very quickly” and “when I respond to it, it should respond to the fact that I was
responding to it”.
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A less significant category of critical feedback, though nonetheless relevant to the
systems’ external technical apparatus, comprised issues that can be clearly linked to
extra-architectural issues such as hardware. For example, although there are also
psychoacoustic phenomena to consider, a reported dissatisfaction with a percevied lack
of changes in loudness (of the system’s output) was, at least in part, due to compression
in the external amplifier. This was concluded on the basis of audio recordings that
bypassed the amplifier, which indicate significant variation in system output amplitude.
A perceptibly wide variation in system output loudness was also confirmed when using
a Disklavier, which was not part of the initial study. Also, for reasons described above,
those using pickups were generally more satisfied with the system’s interactions. This
suggests the need for a stricter approach to feedback prevention in the apparatus setup
for future studies.
The third category of criticism pertains to deliberately imposed experimental
constraints. These are also of interest, as they give some indication of the performers’
general inclinations. For example, while the emphasis on the performative over the sonic
dimension in the experimental design appeared to be generally successful, as indicated
by comments such as “it felt quite organic to me to improvise with a piano”, some
participants found the amplified software synthesis to be problematic for effective
acoustic musical interaction. This suggests a potential refinement by using an
electromechanically controlled acoustic piano (e.g., a Disklavier), which was part of the
follow-up study described below.
On the other hand, a problem that arose directly from the use of piano sounds was that,
in some cases, it led to an expectation of humanlike piano competency. This was
problematic in the sense that the system did not take pianistic skill into account; for the
purposes of the experiment, there was a mere addition of a hard-coded upper and lower
bound to constrain output within the piano pitch range. The system was thus unable to
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actively form chords conforming to socialized expectations and unable to match the
usual traversal patterns of human hands, although idiosyncratic vertical and polyphonic
structures emerged from its output. These limitations were a deliberate design choice
based on the aims of the study; from a technical standpoint, if the aim were to emulate
human piano competence, it would be straightforward to use known probabilities for
note transitions and concurrence.
Several participants were also disappointed by the absence of timbres such as those
made by directly manipulating the inside of an acoustic piano, and some expressed a
desire to interact with more radical electronic timbres. These considerations underscore
the significance of topics such as embodiment and culturally situated aesthetic
sensibilities to music cognition research.
Follow-up Study
Based on participant feedback from the first study and additional theoretical
considerations, a second iteration of Odessa was developed and tested.
Second iteration design
To improve Odessa’s interaction ability, further emphasis was given to its ability to adapt
to changes in musical context. Its lack of contextually significant adaptation was
identified as a shortcoming in the previous round of participant feedback. Port,
Cummins, and McAuley (1995) discuss entrainment as a general basis of adaptation and
pattern recognition in an ecological context. Entrainment has also been discussed in the
context of ethnomusicology by Clayton et al. (2005, p. 4), who define it as “the
interaction and consequent synchronization of two or more rhythmic processes or
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oscillators,” consistent with the definition in Port, Cummins, and McAuley (1995). A full
discussion of entrainment is beyond the present scope, however, the theory of
entrainment (especially given its apparent relation to ecological psychology) has
suggested a way to implement a pitch-based memory-like system for Odessa.
Specifically, for the second iteration of Odessa, a module was added with a virtual
oscillator for each discrete pitch, which would get “excited" by incoming pitches (i.e.,
would entrain to them), and gradually decay. With this, input to the system is, as before,
rapidly taken in, and output is still rapidly produced, but — rather than a direct transfer
of input pitch to output pitch, as in the first iteration — for the second iteration, the
input pitch is directed to the memory module, and the output is taken from a random
selection of still excited frequencies. All pitches have designated independent registers,
and all decay independently at an equal rate, returning to a resting state after ten
seconds. This duration was chosen after empirical testing, on the basis that it seemed to
adapt output well to both gradual and rapid changes in input. If an input pitch is
repeated while its equivalent is still excited in memory, then, regardless of where it is in
the decay process, the equivalent pitch in the memory is maximally excited again.
While this module, in its current form, precludes pattern recognition, it does seem to
offer closely related pitch patterns on the basis of arbitrary combinations of excited
pitches. It also prevents the effect of Odessa “too closely following", originally found to
be problematic by participants. Significantly, this iteration still avoids a naive memory
buffer model; it remains a simple Subsumption design; and it remains compatible with
the ecological analysis of improvisation that led to using a Subsumption design in the
first place (based in part on Clarke (2005) and Clark (1997)). On the other hand, the lack
of pattern recognition is a significant limitation for which appropriate solutions will be
considered in future research.
31
Methodology of follow-up study
After implementing this memory module, a follow-up study was undertaken with the
second iteration of the system. This study departed from the initial study in other ways,
as well. For one, a major shortcoming of the first study, the synthesized piano sound,
was remedied by using a electromechanically controlled acoustic piano (Yamaha
Disklavier) for the follow-up study. This also meant, however, that some points of
comparison between studies were expected to relate mainly to the shift from synthesized
to acoustic piano.
The follow-up study used two participants from the first study, renowned improvisors
Evan Parker (soprano saxophone) and John Russell (guitar), to facilitate a comparison
across studies. The participants were, at this point, aware of the system design and the
general experimental approach and initial results, as they had been sent documentation
of the system design and first study. The design extension, however, was not disclosed
to the participants prior to the study. Overall, the follow-up study focused on different
issues. It also added a trio performance, with both human participants and Odessa. (For
the trio performance, the two instruments played by humans were mixed at equal levels
into a composite mono signal, which was received by Odessa as input.) The follow-up
study participants (Parker and Russell) have also kindly granted their permission to use
the musical audio from the follow-up study as supplementary material:
<https://soundcloud.com/adamlinson/odessa-2nd-study-parker-1/s-4imb6>.
After each of their duet performances with Odessa, they were asked to speak about their
experience in a semi-structured interview that followed an unstructured think-aloud
protocol, as described in the first study. They were not permitted to hear each other’s
verbal responses for either of their duet performances. Before and after the trio
performance, however, they took part in a group interview that allowed some shared
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themes to be explored.
Results summary and discussion
For the second iteration of the system, the participant feedback suggests that, positively,
the system exhibited a cohesive, unified identity, and that it was typically responsive,
playful and more capable of context sensitivity. However, it still lacked the ability to
recognize human responses as such, which meant that it could not engage in a
dramatugical escalation of musical ideas. Its lack of emotion was also found to be
significant. It is interesting to note that the lack of emotion was not identified prior to the
second iteration, perhaps because the system’s improved adaptive capability increased
expectations of its behavior.
Concerning Odessa’s cohesive, unified identity in the second iteration, for instance, the
interviewer (the lead author) asked if it seemed that there was one person sitting at the
piano the whole time, or if it might have seemed that someone left and then someone
else came along. Parker (EP) responded, “no, it didn’t feel like that to me, it felt like one
person,” and Russell (JR) gave a similar response: “no, it’s the same piano player, as it
were, there”. This suggests that the additional module, in the context of the interplay
between Subsumption layers, still resulted in a coherent identity for the system, and was
perhaps enhanced by it. In related comments, JR stated that “it felt like there was a kind
of broader identity than just a sort of immediate kind of stimulus–response thing in the
present”; “it didn’t feel like it was a kind of random response. You know, there was
something under the hood that was- [...] you know, like personality or something to it”.
At one point, JR mentioned that the system had an “incessant” quality, and in a
follow-up question, he was asked if this meant it was more like playing along with a
recording. He responded that this was not at all the case: “it’s really responding to what
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you’re doing, which you wouldn’t get from a recording. Playing along to a recording is a
completely different feel. [Playing with Odessa is] like playing with a chum, really, you
know, albeit a robot chum. [...] I mean trying to improvise to pre-recorded stuff is
awful”. He concluded that “the program is very playful, that’s the point I’m trying to
make. It’s very playful, and that’s fun ... the program responds enough to be playful”
(JR).
In the trio context, EP found that the experience of performing with the system was
helped by the interplay with another human improvisor (JR). As EP stated, “I quite
enjoyed the piano playing in that [trio] context. And, as I say, I found it easier to deal
with because I knew [JR] would carry the main line for a bit, so I can be over here, sort of
playing accompaniment with the piano, and then shift to another- go directly to [JR] and
see what the piano would do.” Although he does not refer to the notion of personality,
there is a sense conveyed that Odessa was able to serve different roles, including jointly
accompanying JR, and that this was able to facilitate an experience more similar to
experiences with human players.
Perhaps due to the improvements in the second iteration of the system, certain inherent
limitations were brought into sharper relief: “it doesn’t realise when it has done
something which has made a significant impact on me, or where I’ve taken something
from the piano and either developed that, or transposed it, or imitated it” (EP). It was
also noted that “it doesn’t have much sense of dramaturgy”,“total form” or “emotional
significance” (EP), and “it’s not got a sense of irony that a human would have” (JR).
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General Discussion
It seems reasonable to conclude that at least some of Odessa’s limitations can be viewed
as a result of the design premises, setting aside the specific implementation. In particular,
a substantial addition to the design would be required to overcome its presently
identified limitations, possibly compromising the fundamentals of a Subsumption
design. Ultimately, the tendency of the system to return to a narrow range of behavior,
which can be conceptualized as its tendency to homeostasis (Ashby 1952/1960), has
been experienced as a drawback in the aesthetic-social realm of free improvisation.
However, it is possible to consider some interesting relationships between following,
pattern recognition, entrainment, and ecological psychology (in particular, the theory of
affordances), with respect to the present study. Dannenberg (1985) was one of the first to
describe systems addressing a computer’s responsiveness to human musical performers.
Yet a recent framework proposed by Dannenberg et al. (2013) to coordinate studies of
human-computer live musical performance primarily conceives of (human and
computer) musicians as followers (of tempo, score, soloist, conductor, etc.). This sense of
following is no doubt a central aspect of many common forms of musical performance.
As such, to facilitate more widespread use of such interactive technologies, their project
is focused on achieving practical results.
From another perspective, however, it is interesting to consider how such following
competencies arise from a cognitive standpoint. Large and Kolen (1994, p. 177) view
“the perception of metrical structure as a dynamic process where the temporal
organization of external musical events synchronizes, or entrains, a listener’s internal
processing mechanisms”. Their solution for modeling this phenomenon is to use a
network of dynamical systems that can “self-organize temporally structured responses
to rhythmic patterns”. Doffman (2009) presents an analysis of collective improvisation
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that supports this view, linking empirical data related to dynamical systems theory with
subjective experiential data considered from an ethnographic perspective. The analysis
by Doffman suggests that a future version of Odessa could coordinate metrical aspects of
music with co-performers more effectively than the present version using a cognitive
mechanism that would preserve the current architecture (see also Angelis et al. 2013).
In designing Odessa, it was assumed that a performer playing along with static (e.g.
pre-recorded) source material would not have the experience of a collaborative
performance. At the other end of the spectrum, it was known that computationally
intricate systems could produce sophisticated humanlike improvisational behavior (cf.
Braasch et al. 2012, Van Nort et al. 2013). The research presented above sought to
investigate if a fundamentally simple system could be dynamic enough to engage an
expert human improvisor, or if it would remain closer to the experience of interacting
with a static source.
The hypothesized viability of the ‘simple system’ approach rested on the premise of
using basic cues to induce the performer’s attribution of intentionality to the agent,
implemented using Subsumption. For Odessa, the mechanisms producing psychological
cues for the perception of intentional agency seem to be effective in establishing it as a
legitimately collaborative partner. Even with its limited musicality, it also seems to
produce the right cues for facilitating the general behavior of collaborative free
improvisation. However, it is clear that its lack of understanding of musical significance,
of long-term musical structure, of emotion and dramaturgy, are critical limitations.
While the interplay of layers in Odessa allows it to, for example, play material that
diverges from a human co-performer, for a typical expert improvisor, such divergence is
not merely arbitrary, but is motivated by structural, dramaturgical, or emotional aspects
that require a level of understanding both of what other players are doing, and what the
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whole piece appears to be doing. It is improbable that an artificial agent could exhibit
this level of understanding without a vastly more complex apparatus, such as one with
deep similarities to human biology.
Conclusions and Future Work
Given the successes of the first and second iterations of the system, a lot has been
learned about the capability of a small collection of simple mechanisms to model the
behavior of a collaborative improvisor. This investigation has considered the role of the
contextual framework for interaction, the role of the inferences and interpretations made
by collaborating musicians, and some of the cue production mechanisms that facilitate
these inferences. It has been shown that a parsimonious Subsumption system can
achieve a complex and robust musical interaction that goes a remarkable distance
towards human-level expertise without the use of elaborate, sophisticated, and
expensive computation. In particular, Odessa achieves its performance without the use of
machine learning, probabilistic analysis, or formal musical knowledge.
Research on Odessa supports the idea that in-the-moment inferences, based on
behavioral cues perceived in real time, can lead to the attribution of intentional agency.
Furthermore, the fact that the musical behavior exhibited by Odessa was typically
regarded as musically coherent supports another aspect of perceptual cue theory: the
notion that musical cues can lead to inferences regarding musical structures and
relationships that are not necessarily formally encoded or deliberately enacted in the
formulation or production of material. Cues are effective relative to an interpretive
context, which is in line with the ecological view that agents respond to different aspects
of their environment depending on what is relevant to them at a given moment.
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Subsumption robots, for example, in their agent–environment interaction, display an
ecological sense of “intelligence” by responding to the environmental cues that are
relevant to their performance. Significantly, Odessa provides a basis for extending an
ecological theory of cues to an environment containing other agents, that is, for
agent–agent interaction. Thus, this research interestingly ties together superficially
unrelated research in human developmental psychology, cognitive ethology, and music
perception theory, and, more generally, also connects to topics in robotics, AI, cognitive
science, and neuroscience.
Continued research on Odessa will focus on two main areas and their interrelationships,
namely, both individual and social aspects of improvised music-making, especially from
an ecological perspective. At the individual level, neural models of memory, attention
and inference in musical improvisation will be investigated. At the social level,
questions of co-creativity, distributed cognition, and related topics will be explored.
In the diverse field of interactive improvisational music systems, the present research is
both a continuation of earlier work by others and a starting point for a new direction.
Current insights from the research on Odessa can be applied to other interactive
improvisation systems, for a variety of both aesthetic and scientific research purposes. It
is hoped that future work with the system can also contribute to other areas of scientific
inquiry and unique cultural pursuits.
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